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ARTICLES
LIFE, LIBERTY, HAPPINESS AND JONATHAN FRANZEN’S
FREEDOM
CAMILLA NELSON
ABSTRACT: This essay explores the relationship between happiness and
the American liberal project as it features in Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom.
It investigates the ways in which the idea of happiness is structured by, and
inscribed within, the form and origins of the social novel, with
consequences for the novelist and the wider culture.
Few nations have been so intimately associated with the idea of happiness
as the United States of America. Few countries can claim to have enshrined
happiness — or, at least, the right to its pursuit — within their founding
political documents, and no other country has so remorselessly articulated
this idea of the ‘pursuit of happiness’ in terms of competitive individualism
and the acquisition of wealth. It is therefore unsurprising that Jonathan
Franzen, America’s best-known apologist for the social novel, should
choose happiness as a talking point during his brief antipodean stop on the
whirlwind tours that followed the publication of his phenomenally
successful third novel, The Corrections.1 During this Sydney visit in 2003,
Franzen informed a solidly middle class audience that the most difficult
subject matter for a writer to tackle was not dreams (readers want to stay in
present action), delusions (readers want to sense a clear goal),
unsympathetic characters (characters need only be empathetic, not
sympathetic), or indeed, anxiety, depression, aging parents or Alzheimer’s
disease (all of which have featured prominently in Franzen’s work), but
happiness.2 Happiness, Franzen told his audience, is virtually unwriteable.
This essay investigates Franzen’s claim that happiness is harder for a writer
to handle than desperation and why — as Franzen blithely went on to assert
in the very next sentence — the only writer who may have succeeded in
bringing happiness to the printed page is Leo Tolstoy.
Half a dozen years after Franzen’s Festival appearance downunder, it was
apposite that both happiness and Tolstoy should feature as significant
themes in Franzen’s latest novel, Freedom — a novel that examines the idea
of happiness in the context of the American liberal project.3 In Freedom the
problem of happiness as a consequence of living for oneself or living for
others — which is such a fundamental consideration in everything that
Tolstoy wrote — is rearticulated around a more traditional liberal formula in
which the idea of individualism jostles up against a vague sort of gesturing
towards the concept of the common good.
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There is a scene in Freedom when Joey Berglund walks into his dormitory
at college to find his friend Jonathan reading John Stuart Mill. The allusion
to Mill invites the reader to speculate that it is Mill’s work that is at the
centre of the novel’s concerns — and indeed, Mill’s brand of liberal
individualism is not a bad lens through which the meaning of the novel can
be viewed. In the late eighteenth century, British utilitarianism grounded
ethics in self-interest. According to Jeremy Bentham and James Mill (father
to John Stuart), people act purely in their self-interest and the goal to which
self-interest aspires is happiness. The proper goal of conduct is therefore to
maximize pleasure and minimize pain. This is what Bentham called the
principle of utility, ‘that principle which approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in
question.’4 Bentham and James Mill were political progressives in their day,
and their ambition to ameliorate the existence of all human beings perhaps
disguised — for a time, at least — the fact that utility and self-interest might
not be all there is to the common good or indeed all there is to happiness.
According to Bentham, ethical conduct is ultimately defined as that which
produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number. This ready equation
of goodness, pleasure and happiness flew in the face of ideas that had been
of concern to philosophers since Aristotle argued that a person is not made
happy by fleeting pleasures, but by fulfillment stemming from meaning and
purpose.5
Immanuel Kant, for example, in a strident critique of the utilitarian tradition
argued, ‘This principle of one’s own happiness bases morality upon
incentives that undermine rather than establish it, and that totally destroy its
sublimity, in as much as motives to virtue are put in the same class as
motives to vice and in as much as such incentives merely teach one to
become better at calculation, while the specific difference between virtue
and vice is obliterated.’6 Indeed, there is a strong contrary tradition in
eighteenth and nineteenth century German neo-humanist philosophy,
running through Kant and Hegel to materialist philosophers such as Karl
Marx — the later famously arguing that happiness is a type of selfrealization or self-actualization brought about by meaningful work. Marx
also attacks Bentham, arguing that ‘With the driest naiveté he takes the
modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man.
Whatever is useful to this queer normal man, and to his world, is absolutely
useful. This yard-measure, then, he applies to past, present, and future …
With such rubbish has the brave fellow, with his motto, ‘nulla dies sine
line!’ piled up mountains of books.’7 According to Marx, Bentham was
historically specific and ‘could only have been manufactured in England.’8
Nietzsche on some levels appeared to agree. ‘Man does not strive after
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happiness,’ he famously wrote, ‘only the Englishman does.’9
Nevertheless, the dominant structure of popular understandings of happiness
in the Anglophone world remains broadly utilitarian — and the English
definition of happiness has been particularly influential in literature. In
terms of narrative, it corresponds with the traditional nineteenth century plot
in which individual self-interests come into conflict with one another and
obstacles accumulate, reaching a crisis followed by a resolution in which
happiness is distributed to the virtuous in the form of marriage and more
particularly — especially in writers such as Charles Dickens — in the guise
of wealth. In the sense of a writer’s craft this is what makes happiness as an
extended dramatic narrative impossible, as Franzen, though perhaps for
different reasons, alleged. Happiness is not action, but resolution. Happiness
is not plot, but payoff after the set-up of the plot. Moreover, if self-interest
guides action, it might even be speculated that self-interested action in the
novel generally takes the form of self-help. Hence, the dependence of the
traditional plot on motivated, goal-orientated action — characters must
shape the plot through their own efforts, or readers will feel disappointed. In
Freedom, this structural problem rapidly transforms into a vision of the
world in which all happiness exists at the cost of others’ happiness, and all
freedom exists at the cost of others’ freedom.
Of course it is John Stuart Mill, rather than Bentham, who is invoked in
Freedom. And though Mill's work wholeheartedly defends Bentham’s ideas
— that ‘happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain’, that
‘actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’,10 that ‘the great majority of
good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of
individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of
the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the
particular person concerned’, that there is no need for people to ‘fix their
minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large’11 — he
also introduces a number of interesting modifications to the utilitarian
formula. Mill argues, for example, that happiness is different to a
‘continuity of highly pleasurable excitement’. He argues that the happiness
of the ancients ‘was not a life of rapture; but moments of such, in an
existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and varied pleasures,
with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as
the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable
of bestowing’.12 Happiness, for Mill, consists therefore of pleasures, pains,
activities, and the dignity to be gained from he calls ‘mental culture’.13
Placing to one side the stuffiness that values ‘high’ or ‘mental’ culture over
what Mill calls ‘low’ pleasures (an educated middle class prejudice that is
even to be found in Marx), the central question becomes one about what
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‘manner of existence’ is worth having.14 Mill, however, does not modify the
utilitarian emphasis on pleasure. The ancient conception of happiness — the
eudemonia of Aristotle, for example — that places overwhelming emphasis
on correct activity is too alienating for Mill. He famously articulates the
reasoning for this decision in his autobiography, in which Mill recollects a
bout of depression occasioned by a childhood deprived of pleasures, about
which he points out that a human being might act correctly yet still feel like
‘a stock or a stone.’15 In short, Mill’s position is not a simple hedonistic one.
He does not equate happiness with pleasure, as Bentham does, but he is also
not austere. Rather, Mill points to the deep need that human beings have of
feeling comforted — he is fundamentally an individualist, but he also
recognizes the need to escape the terrifying idea of being alone, or, at least,
of being alone without any inner emotional strength or resources to draw
upon. Just as Mill suggests that the individual might turn to literature for
comfort (in the case of Mill’s psychological crisis, it was Wordsworth), so
too does Franzen argue that ‘the first lesson reading teaches is how to be
alone.’16
The fact that Freedom is fundamentally a novel about happiness might
easily escape some readers, not only because Franzen’s characters are
commonly found reaching for the whisky and Zoloft, but also because
hovering at the edges of the author’s own celebrity image is the ever-present
suspicion that Franzen himself — like the characters he so artfully creates
— is something of an egotist. ‘He is not a masochist,’ wrote James Wolcott
in a not untypical review of Franzen’s essay collection How to be Alone, ‘he
is a shrewd passive aggressive … courting sympathy by constantly telling
us where it hurts and fastening reader interest on himself, regardless of the
issue or controversy. No matter what is flying around Franzen, the softfocus lens is always on him.’17 Such is the power of the author’s image that
it is difficult to prevent it from framing the meaning of the texts, with even
the best of critics repeatedly reading the novels in relation to the image of
the author as ‘a conflicted white male liberal,’18 for example, who is, to take
another example, ‘afflicted by a strange lack of awareness’ about the world
and the place of his novels within that world.19 Of course, Franzen the
celebrity relentlessly styles himself as a relic from a more literary — if less
literate — age. His essays of the 1990s and 2000s repeatedly allude to the
outmodedness of the novel form — we live, argues Franzen, in the twilight
of the written word. In the essays, the author’s solitude, and, indeed, the
essential loneliness that characterizes his implied reader is constantly
represented as heroic. The author’s interiority, his ‘angry’ moods20 and
‘lonely’ feelings,21 are repeatedly represented as if they provided a kind of
unmediated access to the body politic; personal feelings relentlessly appear
as indicators of social progress, or more often — especially in the face of
the ‘electronic apotheosis of mass culture’22 — of social perdition.
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Stephen Burn, in his study of Franzen’s novels, cuts against this idea that
the author persona embodied in the essays provides the keys to the author’s
fiction, situating the novels, and the Corrections in particular, as part of a
wider reaction against the alleged self-absorption that marks the end of the
postmodern era. He argues that the Corrections is a novel that ‘more
obviously’ addresses the ‘idea of a real world beyond the problems raised
by non-referential systems of discourse.’23 However, a reception-based
analysis would suggest that the essays form an important set of paratexts
that effectively frame the ways in which Franzen’s work is regularly being
read, and that an exploration of the ways in which a text circulates in culture
is for many critics a lucid and satisfying line of inquiry. It is for this reason,
perhaps, that for critics influenced by post-structural theorists such as
Roland Barthes, Edward Said or D.A. Miller, who argued that the
widescreen social novel of the nineteenth century was instrumental in
fostering the confidence with which the middle classes foisted their moral
identity onto the rest of society, not to mention the colonised world,
Franzen’s most recent work possibly represents the western imperial project
come back to life.24 In a more limited sense, in so far as the theme of
happiness is concerned, it is merely worrying that the texts do not seem to
make it clear that there is, as the modern proverb goes, a deal of difference
between being good and feeling good.
Freedom is a story about the disintegrating marriage of the Berglunds, a
middleclass couple similar in type to the Lamberts who featured in The
Corrections. Walter Berglund is a lawyer turned environmental activist,
who is married to Patty, an occasionally alcoholic stay-at-home mum. Their
marital relationship is complicated by the presence of Walter’s oldest friend,
the punk rocker Richard Katz, who has been the object of Patty’s erotic
fantasies since her days as a college basketball star. Franzen has never been
afraid to float a theme with the candor of a television commercial. In
Freedom the title of the novel — which appears in an aptly cinematic
typeface on the cover of most editions — draws attention to the novel’s
central idea, which is to juxtapose the liberal principle of abstract freedom
with the messy reality of life. It is an excess of freedom, accompanied by an
excess of affluence, which causes the novel’s characters to lurch between
anger and desperation. Patty slashes the tyres of her neighbours’ SUV in
retaliation against their house extension, and eventually has an affair with
Katz, whose worst-selling album is — of course — entitled Insanely
Happy.25 Walter is obsessed with apocalyptic scenarios about the overpopulation of the planet, and embroiled in bizarre financial schemes to save
a non-endangered songbird called the Cerulean Warbler. Jessica, the
Berglunds’ oldest child, is better than good, a fact to which Patty seems to
be oblivious. Patty is besotted with Joey, her black sheep Republican son,
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who ends up selling faulty military hardware to the US forces in Iraq. Joey’s
girlfriend Connie self harms in order to express her love for her would-be
husband. Joey marries Connie, then following an adulterous affair, searches
through his own turds — a literal image — to find his wedding ring. Sundry
other motifs and metaphors link the characters’ lives to the novel’s themes,
working together to highlight the fact that all the characters in the novel are
on a voyage of discovery to find out what it means to be a ‘deeply unhappy
person’.26 Nevertheless, it is not the happiness, but the suffering that the
characters inflict on those who are nearest to them that gives the novel its
dimension and power. Far from being models of happiness, the characters
willfully destroy their own happiness and the happiness of others. ‘There’s a
kind of happiness in unhappiness,’ the narrator argues,27 not in any quietist
way, but in order to point out that it is the characters capacity for endless
self-absorption that is so deeply wrong with the that world he portrays.
The theme of self-absorption continues with the use of environmentalism as
a device to describe how far the characters’ self-interests clash with the selfinterests of others. Walter takes a job with a resources entrepreneur, who is
intent on establishing a chain of bird sanctuaries for the Cerulean Warbler,
that would encompass wildlife reserves reaching from somewhere near
Alaska in the North to Patagonia in South America. Of course, it is not only
the fate of the songbird but the whole of American society that riles Walter,
who soon becomes an ‘angry crank’.28 ‘This fragmentation,‘ he cries, in a
televised rant to disenfranchised Appalachian farmers about overconsumption, SUVs and urban sprawl, ‘it’s like the Internet or cable TV —
there’s never any center, there’s no communal agreement, there’s just a
trillion little bits of distracting noise. We can never sit down and have any
kind of sustained conversation, it’s all just cheap trash and shitty
development’.29 This lack of regard for the common good is also presented
historically, as an integral part of the American national story. Walter’s
father, who emigrated from the old world, is represented as just ‘another
data point in the American experiment of self government, an experiment
statistically skewed from the outset, because it wasn’t the people with
sociable genes who fled the crowded old world for the new continent; it was
the people who didn’t get along well with others’.30 The brutality of the
social satire resides in the price to be exacted for the Cerulean sanctuaries.
Walter’s employer intends to pay for the reserves by selling coal rights for
mountain top removal, or ‘MTR’ — literally blasting the tops off mountains
— turning wilderness into wasteland, which, Walter attempts to argue, can
be scientifically reclaimed. The final irony is that the plan to save the
songbird eventually includes a deal that will rehouse Appalachian farmers in
suburban luxury of the sort that Walter riles against, complete with jobs in
the armaments industry, making bombs for American President George
Bush to dump on Iraq.
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Indeed, George Bush broods over the novel like a menacing Public Enemy
Number One. He serves as a figure that tethers the moral anarchy of the
fictional world to the larger American experience, and particularly to the
peculiarly American construction of individualism, happiness and freedom.
Various alternatives to the ideology of individualism are explored in the
novel. Patty is the perhaps only character who possesses the gift of
community building, whether as the dangerously fond mother of her
children, or cake-baking neighbour. Patty, for all her many faults, appears to
have the greatest ability to get along with other people. The Berglund family
starts out in the novel picket-fence perfect then falls apart largely because
Patty loses her capacity to mediate between herself, members of the family,
and other people. Order is only restored when Patty manages to find a shaky
new foundation for her life, bringing a sense of healing to her fragmented
family.
Patty, however, is a long way short of a solution to the novel’s political
dilemmas. In reality, it is middle class affluence and Walter’s indulgence
that has made her role as a stay-at-home mother viable. There is also a
terrible sense that, as a young woman, Patty seemed to be using marriage
and motherhood as an excuse to hide from the world’s grim reality.
Nevertheless, at the end of the novel, it is Patty who heals the rift between
Walter and the residents of the lakeside housing estate that has grown up
around the old family holiday home where Walter has taken refuge
following the breakdown of their marriage — particularly the family whose
Cerulean songbird-eating cat Walter had earlier kidnapped and dropped off
at the city pound. Patty bakes cookies, gives barbeques, brings Christmas
gifts, and admires the multiple offending cats that have been bought to
replace the old one. At this point in the novel, Patty has also begun to
resume her role in her children’s lives, relationships previously attenuated
by parental self-absorption. In Jessica’s life Patty does this — paradoxically
— by remaining distant, restraining herself from commenting on the
catastrophic drummer boyfriend or the windy-worded blog posts, by giving
her daughter the space to make her own mistakes.
In contrast to the practical forms of benevolence that Patty represents,
Walter’s good causes are so abstract that they baffle and bewilder the
reader. The novel’s comedy resides in the fact that the schemes of Walter’s
philanthropic employer obviously create more harm than good. It is
therefore not surprising that Walter’s good causes are seen to arise from his
own repressed anger and latent egoism. Walter himself partly realizes this.
‘He was aware of the intimate connection between anger and depression,
aware that it was mentally unhealthy to be exclusively obsessed with
apocalyptic scenarios, aware of how, in his case, obsession was feeding off
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frustration’.31 It is almost a relief when Walter is upbraided by his politically
more palatable daughter Jessica, who alerts him to the unsavory class
aspects of his anger — pointing out the reasons why Walter’s televised rant
to the impoverished farmers falls a long way short of being politically
acceptable. Jessica too, is morally textured. Her wish to appear politically
and culturally sensitive results in her asking Lalitha, Walter’s Bengali
assistant, to cook an Indian meal, only to be rebuffed by Lalitha’s assertion
that she doesn’t cook. Jessica’s ethical system is derived from textbooks, or
so the novel seems to argue. Just like the windy-worded blog posts, her
ideals are so many words. Jessica, like her father, lacks experience.
Nevertheless, it is Jessica who points out to Patty that the crux of her misery
derives from the fact that she lacks activity. Earlier, the reader is told, ‘By
almost any standard, [Patty] led a luxurious life. She had all day every day
to figure out some decent and satisfying way to live, and yet all she ever
seemed to get for all her choices and all her freedom was more miserable’.32
Following the breakdown of her marriage, Patty finds new meaning in life
by working as a teacher’s aid in a private school. ‘Almost every day of the
school year, after class, for a few hours, she gets to disappear and forget
herself, and be one of the girls again, be wedded by love to the cause of
winning games and yearn pure heartedly for her players to succeed’.33 The
reader is told, ‘A universe that permits her to do this, at this relatively late
point in her life, in spite of her not having been the best person, cannot be a
wholly cruel one’.34 Patty, the former college basketball star, is a team
player, but she can only cheer for her own team. She tries to fill her empty
summers when the school where she works is out by volunteering for the
city parks, and working outdoors with disadvantaged kids, but finds ‘she
needs a real team, her own team, to discipline and focus on winning’.35 The
point here is that Patty’s benevolence starts with her family — her team —
and doesn’t really extend much beyond it. Hence, there is ultimately not
much difference between Patty and the families with the bird-eating cats on
the housing estate at the novel’s conclusion — each family looks out for
itself, each team competes against the other, each cat pounces on the
Cerulean songbird.
Despite the tantalizing reference to Mill, the most ubiquitous allusion to
happiness in Freedom is to the very different — and fundamentally
communitarian — perspective of Tolstoy. In particular, Patty, during a
pivotal crisis concerning her affair with Richard Katz, is both led astray —
and arguably saved — by reading War and Peace. It would not be an
exaggeration to argue that the whole of Tolstoy’s work is centrally
concerned with happiness. His characters speak incessantly about happiness.
‘I have lived much and now I think I know what is needed for happiness,’
says Sergey in Family Happiness.36 ‘Happiness lies in living for other

AUSTRALIASIAN JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES

9

people,’ says Olenin in The Cossacks.37 ‘My vocation is to be happy with
another kind of happiness, the happiness of love and self sacrifice,’ says
Princess Marya in War and Peace.38 ‘I can do good, but to cancel injustice
is the greatest happiness,’ thinks Nicholay in the same work.39 ‘They
haven’t an idea of what happiness is!’ says Vronsky in Anna Karenina.40
And then, of course, there is Anna herself — ‘If ever at any moment she had
been asked what she was thinking of, she could have answered truly: of the
same thing, of her happiness and her unhappiness.’41
Like Franzen, Tolstoy is constantly aware of the tension between freedom
and happiness. Tolstoy is continually at pains to demonstrate that freedom is
something that diminishes the more a character is entangled in the affairs of
another, but he also makes it clear that this is because individual and
collective senses of freedom and happiness are tied together. Levin, while
contemplating his impending marriage to Kitty in Anna Karenina, for
example, thinks about his potential loss of freedom. ‘Freedom? Why
freedom? Happiness is only in loving and desiring, thinking her desires, her
thoughts — that is, no freedom at all — that’s what happiness is!’.42 Of
course, it is not always that simple. In War and Peace, Andrey believes he
has found happiness in confining his interests to those, like his family, who
are similar in nature to himself. Pierre thinks he has found the secret of
happiness in living for others. He enthuses about the great chain of being as
a figure for community that leads him to a decision to set his serfs free. But
Andrey makes it clear that Pierre’s serfs have suffered from his inattention
to the economic details of their freedom.
It is only on the surface of Franzen’s text that that the illusion can be
sustained that Freedom is telling its reader something similar to Tolstoy. Of
course, there are things that are uncomfortable in Tolstoy from a twentyfirst century perspective. Tolstoy’s male protagonists are pure, hard, and
upright — and they pontificate horribly upon the souls of their wives.
However, his idea of happiness derives from a communitarian social justice
perspective. He argues that freedom recklessly spent on the self is utterly
meaningless, and that the conflict between freedom and happiness is mostly
contrived. Towards the end of War and Peace, for example, Pierre is
awakened through his experience in French captivity. ‘Pierre learned not
through his intellect, but through his whole being, through life, that man is
created for happiness, that happiness lies in himself, in the satisfaction of his
natural human cravings; that all unhappiness is due, not to lack of what is
needful, but to superfluity.’43 Pierre also learned, ‘… that there is nothing
terrible to be dreaded in the world. He had learned that just as there is no
position in the world in which a man can be happy and perfectly free, so too
there is no position in which he need be unhappy and in bondage. He had
found out that there is a limit to suffering and a limit to freedom, and that
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that limit is very soon reached’.44
Pierre’s earlier embrace of ideas such as ‘greatness’ in the style of Thomas
Carlyle — the idea that heroes are the creative force of history — merely
resulted in a disengagement from life, a loss of purpose. In rejecting such
abstractions Pierre does not reject life or resign himself to suffering, but
rather embraces life. He begins to engage not with the world as an abstract
idea, but with the singularity of lived human experience. He engages not
with the world as it should be, but with the world as it (apparently, or as
Tolstoy would have us believe actually) is. Hence, during the journey from
Orel to Moscow following his recovery from the illness that followed his
release from captivity, Pierre reflects, ‘All the people he saw — the driver,
the overseer of the posting station, the peasants on the road, or in the village
— all had a new significance for him. The presence and observations of [his
companion], who was continually deploring the poverty and ignorance and
backwardness of Russia, compared with Europe, only heightened Pierre’s
pleasure in it. Where [his companion] saw deadness, Pierre saw the
extraordinary mighty force of vitality, the force that sustained the life of that
homogenous, original, and unique people over that immense expanse of
snow’.45
Pierre’s acceptance of the world is not about abnegation or resignation to his
own or other people’s suffering (the reader need only recollect that Pierre
ends War and Peace by plotting the Decembrist uprising). Pierre later
recollects that in this period of ‘happy insanity’ he was ‘not so mad then as I
seemed. On the contrary, I was cleverer and had more insight then than at
any time, and I understood everything worth understanding in life, because
… I was happy’.46 He reflects that his ‘madness showed itself in his not
waiting, as in old days, for those personal grounds, which he had called
good qualities in people, in order to love them; but as love was brimming
over in his heart he loved men without cause, and so never failed to discover
incontestable reasons that made them worth loving’.47 This is perhaps one of
Tolstoy’s most powerful and perturbing arguments. It is only by paying
attention to the world as it is, and to people as they are, that a truly ethical
— and therefore happy — engagement with the world becomes possible.
Franzen’s characters are admittedly not as spiritually ambitious as
Tolstoy’s. They live in an age of ennui occasioned by a pervasive belief in
the reality of cultural decline. There are numerous disquieting questions
almost casually thrown in at the end of the book. Walter’s estranged brother
Mitch suddenly appears. He is homeless, but Walter neglects to take him in.
The families on the housing estate that has been encroaching on Walter’s
refuge begin to fall victim to the economic bust, but they too remain distant
in their suffering. In the novel’s final irony, the family holiday house is
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turned into a sanctuary for the Cerulean songbird and the reader is forced to
see, if they have not already seen, that the freedom of the songbird —
America’s freedom — has only been obtained by the imposition of violence
on the rest of the planet. Walter eventually relinquishes his grand political
delusions, but neither he nor indeed Patty appears to have progressed
politically or as human beings. They simply act out the same delusions on a
smaller, less damaging scale — but owing to the force of the plot’s
resolution the inattentive reader may not notice. Franzen attacks the
pretensions behind the murderous ironies of the Bush years — of ‘Operation
Iraqi Freedom’ and ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ — but his characters
ultimately retreat into the same insular middle class docility that gave rise to
such delusions. This could be interpreted as a satirical comment on
America’s path to political and social perdition, except that at the end of the
novel all the happiness gets distributed in line with the most traditional
utilitarian plot. The former arms dealer Joey seems to get the largest share
(through his own ‘self reliance,’ of course), and though Patty has lost the
unquestioning love of her family she also gains thousands from the sale of
her grandfather’s New Jersey estate. There is a moment in Anna Karenina
when Anna is forced to leave off reading an English novel just as the hero
was ‘almost reaching his English happiness,’48 which Tolstoy specifies as
comprising a baronetcy and a landed estate. Freedom is a little like Anna’s
English novel. It contains less of Tolstoy, and, well, more of Charles
Dickens.
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